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“GRAND ENTRANCE HALL,”
BACK DOOR OR FOUNDATION
STONE? THE ROLE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
IN CONSTRUING AND
APPLYING THE CONSTITUTION
OF CANADA
Warren J. Newman

*

The ship of state is run and governed by a most difficult mechanism of rules,
principles, precedents and administrative wheels. Without a thorough knowledge of
this complicated machinery, there is not much use in trying to direct its course in a
proper channel and a correct way.
Maurice Ollivier, Problems of Canadian Sovereignty (1945)

I. INTRODUCTION: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
CONVENTIONS AND PRINCIPLES
In the wake of the Supreme Court of Canada‟s opinions in the Provincial
Court Judges Reference1 and the Quebec Secession Reference,2 the courts have
________________________________________________________________
*
B.A., B.C.L., LL.B. (McGill), of the Bars of Quebec and Ontario; General Counsel,
Constitutional and Administrative Law Section, Department of Justice of Canada. This paper was
originally presented at the April 6, 2001 conference entitled “2000 Constitutional Cases: Fourth
Annual Analysis of the Constitutional Decisions of the S.C.C.” sponsored by the Professional
Development Program at Osgoode Hall Law School. The views expressed herein are meant to
stimulate debate and should not be taken as necessarily reflecting the position of the Department.
1
Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island;
Reference re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward
Island; R. v. Campbell; R. v. Ekmecic; R. v. Wickman; Manitoba Provincial Court Judges Assn. v.
Manitoba (Minister of Justice), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3. The current trend began after the decisions of the
Court in New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly),
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 319, holding inter alia that parliamentary privileges “fall within the group of
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been seized with an ever-burgeoning multitude of new cases in which the
constitutional principles of judicial independence, 3 federalism, democracy, the
rule of law and the protection of minorities 4 have been invoked to challenge the
principles constitutionalized by virtue of [the] preamble” to the Constitution Act, 1867 (at 377, per
McLachlin, J., as she then was, for the majority), and Hunt v. T&N plc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289, in
which interprovincial recognition and enforcement of court judgments were premised on the “full
faith and credit” doctrine “inherent in the structure of the Canadian federation, and, as such, […]
beyond the power of provincial legislatures to override” (at 324, per La Forest J., for the Court).
However, the proliferation of cases invoking constitutional principles became especially noticeable
after the Provincial Court Judges and the Quebec Secession references (infra, note 2).
2
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. I disclose that I was of counsel
for the Attorney General of Canada in this reference and in several of the cases subsequently
referred to in these remarks, including the Potter and Hogan matters (infra, note 4) as well as the
Lalonde case (infra, note 4).
3
See Alberta Provincial Judges’ Assn. v. Alberta (1999), 177 D.L.R. (4th) 418 (Alta.
C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. denied June 8, 2000; Re British Columbia Legislative Assembly,
Resolution on Judicial Compensation (1998), 160 D.L.R. (4th) 477 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to
S.C.C. denied January 21, 1999; Conférence des juges du Québec c. Québec (Procureur général),
[2000] J.Q. No 400 (C.S.Q.); Newfoundland Association of Provincial Court Judges v.
Newfoundland (2000), 191 D.L.R. (4th) 225 (Nfld. C.A.); Ell v. Alberta (2000), 83 Alta. L.R. (3d)
215 (C.A.); Re Independence of the Provincial Court of British Columbia Justices of the Peace
(2000), 81 B.C.L.R. (3d) 164 (S.C.) (per Siguardson J.); Re Therrien, 2001 SCC 35.
4
See Samson v. Canada (Attorney General) (1998), 165 D.L.R. (4th) 342 (F.C.T.D.),
notice of appeal to F.C.A. filed, but appeal subsequently abandoned (principle of democracy);
Brown v. Alberta (1999), 177 D.L.R. (4th) 349 (Alta. C.A.) (principle of democracy); Potter v.
Quebec (Attorney General), [1999] R.J.Q. 165 (S.C.Q.) (principle of protection of minorities raised
in appeal pending before Quebec Court of Appeal; Bacon v. Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corp.
(1999), 180 Sask. R. 20, 205 W.A.C. 20, [1999] 11 W.W.R. 51 (Sask. C.A), leave to appeal to
S.C.C. denied on June 1, 2000 (rule of law principle); Singh v. Canada (Attorney General) (sub nom.
Westergard-Thorpe v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] 3 F.C. 185 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C.
denied on August 10, 2000 (principles of parliamentary supremacy, rule of law and judicial
independence); Lalonde v. Ontario (Commission de restructuration des services de santé) (2000), 48
O.R. (3d) 50 (Div. Ct.), appeal heard May 14 to 17, 2001, and decision of Ontario Court of Appeal
pending (principle of protection of minorities); Hogan v. Newfoundland (Attorney General) (2000),
183 D.L.R. (4th) 225 (Nfld. C.A.), application for leave to appeal before S.C.C. denied on November
9, 2000 (principles of federalism, democracy, rule of law and protection of minorities); Dehenne v.
Dehenne (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 140 (S.C.J.) (principle of protection of minorities); JTI-Macdonald
Corp. v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (2000), 184 D.L.R. (4th) 335 (B.C.S.C.) (federalism
and rule of law); Wilder v. Ontario (Securities Commission) (2000), 184 D.L.R. (4th) 165 (Ont.
Div. Ct.), affd (2001), 197 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (Ont. C.A.) (rule of law, independence of bar and
judiciary); Public School Boards’ Assn. of Alberta v. Alberta (Attorney General), [2000] 2 S.C.R.
409 (refusing to recognize a purported constitutional principle or convention of reasonable
autonomy for municipal institutions, or a principle of mirror equality between rights of public
schools and those of separate schools). Several motions for declaratory judgment challenging the
validity of Bill 170, Quebec‟s municipal amalgamation legislation (S.Q. 2000, c. 56), and related
amendments on the basis, inter alia, of the principles of democracy and the protection of minorities,
have recently been denied by the Quebec Superior Court: Villes de Baie d’Urfé, Westmount,
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validity of constitutional amendments, 5 statutory provisions6 and governmental
action.7 Legal practitioners, long used to equating “the Constitution of Canada”
with the written text of the Constitution Acts,8 were now left wondering as to
the extent to which, if at all, constitutional principles might supplant (or at least
supplement) constitutional provisions as a source of supreme and fundamental
law, and might thus provide the basis for legal rules or constitutional
obligations enforceable by the courts.
The Constitution of Canada, taken in its broader analytical sense, has always
embraced not only the provisions of the written text but also the conventions of
the Constitution — the unwritten rules regarding the operation of the
constitutional framework that political actors consider to be binding upon
themselves and their actions. However, constitutional conventions are more
within the realm of political science 9 than that of law because although they are
normative rules in that they are understood to be obligatory, the sanction for
their breach is a matter for the political process and public opinion, not for the
legal process and the courts. While they have occasionally recognized the
existence of constitutional conventions, the courts have consistently rejected
attempts by litigants to have those conventions applied and enforced in the
same manner as legal provisions and rules. 10 In the Patriation Reference,11 the

Hampstead et autres c. Procureur général du Québec (June 28, 2001), Doc. No. 500-05-062072002 et al., (Que. S.C.), appeal now pending before the Quebec Court of Appeal.
5
See Potter and Hogan, supra, note 4, challenging the validity of the Constitution
Amendment, 1997 (Quebec) and the Constitution Amendment, 1998 (Newfoundland Act),
respectively, relating to denominational schools within each of the two provinces.
6
See, for example, the judicial independence cases in note 3, challenging certain
provisions of various provincial statutes relating to the administration of justice and the
organization of the provincial courts; and the Singh case, challenging section 39 of the Canada
Evidence Act.
7
See, for example, the Samson and Brown cases, supra, note 4, challenging the Senate
appointments process, and Lalonde, supra, note 4, challenging the directives of the Health Services
Commission to Hôpital Montfort in Ottawa.
8
More precisely, the Canada Act 1982 and the Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982: vide s.
52(2) and s. 60.
9
For a useful and fairly recent study in this area by a Canadian political scientist, see
Heard, Canadian Constitutional Conventions: The Marriage of Law and Politics (Toronto: Oxford
University Press Canada, 1991).
10
See, for example, Reference re Sections 26, 27 & 28 of Constitution Act, 1867, [1991] 4
W.W.R. 97 (B.C.C.A.); LeBlanc v. Canada (1991), 80 D.L.R. (4th) 641 (Ont. C.A.); both appeal
courts refusing to pronounce upon the existence of constitutional conventions after the appointment
of additional Senators was an established fact. See also the decision of Riche J. at trial in Hogan v.
Newfoundland (Attorney General) (1999), 173 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 148 (Nfld. T.D.), and most
recently, Ontario English Catholic Teachers’ Assn. v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 15
(March 8, 2001), per Iacobucci J. for the Court, paras. 63-66, upholding the decision of the Ontario
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Supreme Court put a definitive end to the proposition that had been advanced in
some respected academic circles that a convention, although political in origin,
might “crystallize” into a rule of law.
Moreover, even establishing the existence of a constitutional convention
requires a demonstration that the putative conventional rule meets three rather
stringent and objective criteria: there must be a precedent (or series of precedents)
showing adherence to the rule; there must be a reason for the rule; and the rule
must be regarded as obligatory by the political actors to whom it is said to
apply.12 It is this third, “normative” element which the Supreme Court of Canada
has stated is the most important of the three criteria.13 Therefore, while as a matter
of convention, a substantial consensus amongst the provinces was required to
patriate and amend the Constitution along the lines of the federal government‟s
1980-1981 constitutional proposals, there was no conventional requirement that
Quebec‟s consent was a necessary part of that consensus, or that the legislative
assembly or Government of Quebec possessed a conventional power of veto over
the process.
So it was, then, that both prior to and after the enactment of the Canada Act
198214 and the proclamation of its schedule, the Constitution Act, 1982,15 it
could be fairly said, as the Supreme Court put it in the Patriation Reference,
that “constitutional conventions plus constitutional law equal the total
constitution of the country.”16 This was also the stuff of standard contemporary
textbooks on Canadian constitutional law and political science. 17
Court of Appeal (44 O.R. (3d) 7, at 31-32 (per curiam)), dismissing arguments in relation to
denominational schools guarantees based on convention.
11
Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 at 877-83. A
majority of the Court agreed to answer the question as to whether a constitutional convention
requiring provincial consent existed, but distinguished conventions from rules of law: “The
conventional rules of the constitution present one striking peculiarity. In contradistinction to the
laws of the constitution, they are not enforced by the courts. […] This conflict between convention
and law which prevents the courts from enforcing conventions also prevents conventions from
crystallizing into laws, unless it be by statutory adoption” (at 880-82).
12
This is the test formulated by Sir W. Ivor Jennings in The Law and the Constitution, 5th
ed. (London: University of London Press, 1959), and adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in
the Patriation Reference, id., at 888.
13
Reference re Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] 2
S.C.R. 793.
14
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
15
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
16
Patriation Reference, supra, note 11, at 883-84. Put another way, in Osborne v. Canada
(Treasury Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R 69, at 87, per Sopinka J.: “Underlying this distinction between
constitutional law and constitutional conventions is the contrast between legal and political
constitutionalism.”
17
See, for example, Professor Peter W. Hogg‟s Constitutional Law of Canada, student ed.
(Toronto: Carswell Co., 1977), in which he divided the first chapter (“Sources”) of the first part
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II. THE NEW EMPHASIS ON CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
With the Provincial Judges Reference and the Quebec Secession Reference,
suddenly (it seemed), “constitutional principles” had replaced “constitutional
conventions” as the most prominent and important feature of the “unwritten
constitution.” These principles were said to be “not merely descriptive,” but
rather, “invested with a powerful normative force” and “binding upon both
courts and governments.”18 Their role was not only to interpret the existing
terms of the Constitution, but also to be employed, as an innovative tool of
constitutional dentistry, in the “filling of gaps” (and apparently, the adding of
more teeth) in “the express terms of the constitutional text.” 19 Moreover,
establishing these principles did not first require proof that they conformed to
the rigorous set of criteria that applied to determining the existence of
constitutional conventions. The existence of constitutional principles was
largely self-evident.
It did not take the proverbial rocket scientist (or, to modernize the metaphor,
a web page designer) to realize that a whole new vista of legal argument had
just opened up. All it took was a score of reasonably imaginative litigation
lawyers. Within the days,20 weeks and months following the release of the
Quebec Secession Reference opinion, new or revised statements of claim and
defences were filed, challenging or resisting the application of various
constitutional instruments, ordinary statutes and administrative action. If there
(“Basic Concepts”) of his book into five sub-chapters: “The „Constitution‟”; “Imperial Statutes”;
“Canadian Statutes;” “Caselaw;” and “Conventions.” Professor J. Mallory in The Structure of
Canadian Government (Toronto: Gage Publishing, 1971) placed heavy emphasis on the role of
conventions in the opening pages of the first part (“The Pattern of the Constitution”) of his book (at
2): “The Canadian constitution is a product of negotiation and bargaining, of a feeling that the
practical operation is more important than the letter of the law, and that the spirit supersedes the
letter of the agreement. This has made our constitutional law harder to discover and apply than the
American, for it shares the ambiguities of the British constitution. The difference between
American and British constitutionalism is essentially this: for the Americans, anything
unconstitutional is illegal, however right and necessary it may seem; for the British, anything
unconstitutional is wrong, however legal it may be.” See too, Dawson, The Government of Canada,
4th ed., revised by N. Ward (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 1963), Chapter 4, “The Nature
of the Constitution” (at 63-64): “the unwritten constitution is every whit as important as the British
North America Act, and indeed, [...] much of the latter is transformed and made almost
unrecognizable by the operation of the former, which in all these instances consists of established
customs and usages which have grown up over a long period of years.”
18
Quebec Secession Reference, supra, note 2, at para. 54.
19
Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 104.
20
The Supreme Court‟s opinion in the Quebec Secession Reference was rendered on
August 20, 1998. The challenge to the Senate appointments process in the Samson case was
brought almost immediately, and the application for an interlocutory injunction was heard and
decided on September 1, 1998.
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was no tangible support in the words of the textual provisions, or if a
constitutional convention could not easily be proved (and in any event, could
not be enforced at law), the answer for counsel appeared to be obvious: appeal
to principle!
In the Provincial Judges Reference, the former Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court concluded that constitutional principles stride in majestically through the
preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867:21 “the grand entrance hall to the castle
of the Constitution.”22 In certain cases, however, one was tempted to wonder if
their invocation amounted to a concerted effort to slip in through the back door
that which could not be accomplished through straightforward judicial
interpretation of existing textual provisions. Some over-worked governmental
lawyers — already tasked, for example, with developing detailed evidentiary
justification for legislative and governmental action under section 1 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,23 and with fully grasping the scope
of governmental fiduciary obligations under section 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982 — might perhaps be forgiven if they were to have looked upon these new
developments with a doleful and jaundiced eye, and to predict that
constitutional principles would soon become the last refuge of the scoundrel. 24
________________________________________________________________
21

Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 109, per Lamer C.J., for the
majority; but see La Forest J.‟s striking dissent, discussed later in this paper.
23
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11.
24
Here, I am paraphrasing Samuel Johnson‟s observation on patriotism. It appears that at
least one other commentator has also been drawn to Johnson‟s remark in a not entirely dissimilar
context; viz.: “Dr. Johnson was, of course, only partly right. Patriotism can also be noble. But it is
an aphorism worth remembering when we celebrate constitutional patriotism, national or
transnational, and rush to its defence from any challenges to it. How, then, do we both respect and
uphold all that is good in our constitutional tradition and yet, at the same time, keep it and ourselves
under sceptical check?” (Weiler, “Federalism and Constitutionalism: Europe‟s Sonderweg,”
Harvard Law School Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 10/00, 2000; the final version of this paper
will be published in Nicolaidis and Howse (eds.), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of
Governance in the United States and the European Union (New York: Oxford University Press,
2001)). For some trenchant critical analysis of (and a sceptical check upon) the use of constitutional
principles in the New Brunswick Broadcasting case and the Provincial Court Judges and Quebec
Secession references, respectively, see, notably, Leclair and Morrissette, “L‟indépendance
judiciaire et la Cour suprême: reconstruction historique douteuse et théorie constitutionnelle de
complaisance” (1998), 36 Osgoode Hall L.J. 485; Goldsworthy, “The Preamble, Judicial
Independence and Judicial Integrity” (2000), 11:2 Constitutional Forum 60; Hurlburt, “Fairy Tales
and Living Trees: Observations on Some Recent Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada” (1999), 26:2 Manitoba L.J. 181; Hogg, “The Secession Reference: The Duty to Negotiate”
(1998 Constitutional Cases Conference, Osgoode Hall Law School, 16 April 1999), reproduced in
(1999), 7:1-2 Canada Watch 1; Monahan, “The Public Policy Role of the Supreme Court of Canada
in the Secession Reference” (1999), 11 N.J.C.L. 65. Nota bene: Two new and important analyses of
22
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III. THE VITAL ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
This, however, is at best only one side of the story (even for the law officers
of the Crown). First, it must be recognized that by whatever route they may
have entered, constitutional principles have taken up residence and are here to
stay. Indeed, a careful reading of the jurisprudence 25 shows that they have
always been with us, even if their role had never heretofore been quite as fully
articulated and developed as in the Provincial Judges Reference and the
Quebec Secession Reference. Second, like constitutional conventions, which
themselves are grounded in principle,26 constitutional principles reflect the
wisdom that comes with an appreciation of the constitutional values that imbue
the constitutional text. “[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are
expounding,” thundered Chief Justice Marshall of the American Supreme
Court.27 Judicious resort to constitutional principles helps to diminish the
rigidity and inflexibility of thought that might otherwise dominate and stifle the
characterization of the written text, itself amenable to formal amendment only
by a series of procedures that are, at the best of times, difficult to operate.
the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on constitutional principles have been published since I
drafted and presented this paper: see Elliott, “References, Structural Argumentation and the
Organizing Principles of Canada‟s Constitution” (2001), 80 Can. Bar Rev. 67; Walters, “The
Common Law Constitution in Canada: Return of Lex Non Scripta as Fundamental Law” (2001), 51
U.T.L.J. 91.
25
As Riddell J. of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Ontario aptly observed
in Bell v. Town of Burlington, (1915), 34 O.L.R. 619, at 622, “In our usage, that is unconstitutional
which is opposed to the principles, more or less vaguely and generally stated, upon which we think
the people should be governed.” See, for example, the early judgments of the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council on the operation of various facets of the federal principle in construing the
distribution of legislative powers in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and the preCharter dicta in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada inferring principles of freedom
of expression and the rule of law from the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 and the British
constitutional tradition. The key decisions of the Privy Council may be found most conveniently in
the three-volume collection prepared by Richard Olmsted, Q.C., of the Department of Justice,
Canadian Constitutional Decisions of the Judicial Committee (short title), (Ottawa: Queen‟s
Printer, 1954). The key principles emanating from the case law of the Supreme Court of Canada
from 1949 (when it truly became “supreme” with the abolition of new appeals to the Privy Council)
have been very usefully set out by my colleague Louis B.Z. Davis, Canadian Constitutional Law
Handbook: Leading Statements, Principles and Precedents (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1985).
26
To take but one example, in the Patriation Reference, supra, note 11, at 880 and 888,
the “constitutional value” said to be the “pivot” for the conventions of responsible government “is
the democratic principle”; and the “reason for the rule” of substantial provincial consent to the
proposed constitutional amendment “is the federal principle” (at 905). In other words, first
principles are logically prior to (and at least in this case, a condition precedent for) the
establishment of constitutional conventions.
27
McCulloch v. State of Maryland et al., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), at 407 (emphasis
in original).
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Constitutional principles, as our own Supreme Court has rightly stated,
“emerge from an understanding of the constitutional text itself, the historical
context, and previous judicial interpretations of constitutional meaning.” 28 At
the same time, as the Court has also emphasized, the existence of constitutional
principles must not be taken as an invitation to supersede or otherwise to
dispense with the primacy of the written text. To do so would be to put into
question the role of the courts and the legitimacy of constitutional review, 29 the
power of review being judicial rather than legislative in character.
Constitutional principles, unlike constitutional conventions, can be employed
to interpret and apply constitutional and legislative provisions. Constitutional
principles are “binding upon both courts and governments” essentially because
the application of these principles to the interpretation of constitutional and
legislative texts results in a judicial pronouncement on the scope and
application of the law itself.30 This is different from saying that these principles
are themselves law, in the sense that they can be simply substituted for
constitutional provisions that have been promulgated as part of the text of the
supreme law. The very nature of unwritten principles — their judicial and
jurisprudential origin, their broad scope and the flexibility that they bring to the
interpretation of the constitutional instrument — makes it inappropriate to
assimilate them, in absolute terms and without nuance or distinction, to the role
and function of provisions having direct force of law.
Constitutional principles in structural terms (Chief Justice Lamer‟s “castle”)
may be seen, then, as “foundational,” forming part of the “internal architecture”
of the Constitution.31 In dynamic terms (Lord Sankey‟s “living tree” 32), they
“breathe life” into the Constitution; they are “its lifeblood.” Constitutional
principles perform a vital role in construing and applying the provisions of the
Constitution of Canada. The challenge is to ensure that they are employed in a
balanced and stable fashion so that the edifice is supported and not weakened
________________________________________________________________
28

Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 32.
Id., at para. 53, and Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of
Prince Edward Island; Reference re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Provincial
Court of Prince Edward Island; R. v. Campbell; R. v. Ekmecic; R. v. Wickman; Manitoba
Provincial Court Judges Assn. v. Manitoba (Minister of Justice), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 93.
These concerns are discussed later in this paper.
30
The doctrine of precedent (i.e., stare decisis), judicial comity and the hierarchy of the
court structure itself ultimately ensures — to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the
circumstances of a given judicial decision — the binding character of the judicial pronouncement
on other courts or levels of court.
31
Quebec Secession Reference, supra¸ note 28, at paras. 49 and 50.
32
Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.); Quebec Secession
Reference, supra, note 28, at paras. 50, 51 and 52.
29
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from within, and to ensure that their growth is kept within “natural limits” 33 so
that they do not overtake and eventually strangle the organism itself.

IV. “WRITTEN” AND “UNWRITTEN” CONSTITUTIONS
In point of fact, our courts have long recognized an important role for
constitutional principles in deducing the meaning of the constitutional text. This
is all the more the case because our written Constitution — to the untutored
mind, boggling in its level of detail and concern with minutiae34 — is in many
respects less a blueprint for constitutional government than it is a preliminary
sketch of some of its broad lines. This is due in large part to our British
constitutional tradition. The preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 recalled
that heritage and carried it forward into the new Dominion:
Whereas the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick have
expressed their Desire to be federally united into One Dominion under the Crown
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar in
Principle to that of the United Kingdom … [Emphasis added.]35

It is a truism that the British constitution is largely an “unwritten” one, in that
while there are a series of seminal instruments stretching back to at least the
Magna Carta,36 there is no unified, organic, comprehensive and authoritative
statement expressly declaring the fundamental principles, postulates, powers
________________________________________________________________
33
Edwards, supra, note 32, at 136: “The British North America Act planted in Canada a
living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits.”
34
The usual (and convenient, as it is succinctly worded) example is head 9 of the
enumerated heads of federal legislative power in section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867:
“Beacons, Buoys, Lighthouses and Sable Island.” More prolix examples abound, both in the Act of
1867 and the Constitution Act, 1982, as well as in the series of other statutes, orders and related
instruments that make up the written Constitution.
35
The late Senator Eugene Forsey, a lifelong scholar of the Constitution, insisted (at 182)
in his memoirs, A Life on the Fringe (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1990), that the phrase, “a
Constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom,” meant simply the principles of
responsible government. “The Quebec resolutions had said that the executive government was to be
vested in the Queen, to be exercised by Her Majesty personally, or by her representative duly
authorized, „according to the well understood principles of the British Constitution‟. The phrase in
the preamble to the Act was simply the Colonial Office legalese for what the Fathers had proposed.
It had nothing to do with the Bill of Rights or the Habeas Corpus Act. Those enactments became
part of the law of Canada by virtue of the reception of the English law in various parts of Canada
long before Confederation. There is no ground whatever for dragging them in by any preambular
back door.”
36
The aforementioned Bill of Rights, the Act of Settlement and the Habeas Corpus Acts
immediately spring to mind. One of the best collections is to be found in Stephenson and Marchem,
eds., Sources of English Constitutional History: A Selection of Documents from A.D. 600 to the
Interregnum, revised ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).
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and jurisdictions underlying British constitutional government. This is said to
be in contradistinction to the constitutions of the American and French
Republics, to take the most obvious examples. 37

V. JOHN MARSHALL AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW
However, even a written constitution in the American style must be subject
to elucidation. To return to the words of Chief Justice Marshall:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its
great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into
execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be
embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the
public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked,
its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those
objects be deduced by the nature of the objects themselves. That this idea was
entertained by the framers of the American constitution, is not only to be inferred
from the nature of the instrument, but from the language. 38

Some 16 years earlier, by sheer parity of reasoning, Marshall had established
the proposition that the Supreme Court of the United States was mandated by
the Constitution to review the validity of Acts of Congress, although the written
text contained nary a word on judicial review of the constitutionality of laws.
Marshall‟s proposition flowed from first principles, the nature and logic of
constitutionalism itself and the role of the judicial power. 39 His classic
exposition in Marbury v. Madison is reproduced below in extenso:
________________________________________________________________
37

And putting aside the question of constitutional conventions, which, as we have seen,
and as Professor A.V. Dicey maintained (at 28) in his classic text, An Introduction to the Study of
the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London: MacMillan, 1959), are not part of constitutional law,
written or unwritten: “The distinction, in short, between written and unwritten law does not in any
sense square with the distinction between the law of the constitution (constitutional law properly so
called) and the conventions of the constitution.”
38
McCulloch v. State of Maryland et al., supra, note 27, at 407.
39
Some powerful contemporaneous doctrinal support for this proposition may be found in
The Federalist No. 78 drafted by Alexander Hamilton and published in the second volume of the
collected Federalist Papers in 1788. Hamilton wrote:
There is no position which depends on clearer principles than that every act of a delegated
authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No
legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this would be to
affirm [...] that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only what their powers do not
authorize, but what they forbid. [...] the courts were designed to be an intermediate body
between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within
the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar
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The question whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of
the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States; but, happily, not of an
intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to recognize certain
principles, supposed to have been long and well-established, to decide it.
That the people have the right to establish, for their future government, such
principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the
basis, on which the whole American fabric has been erected. […] The principles,
therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. […]
[…] The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits
may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. […] It is a
proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative
act repugnant to it; or that the legislature may alter the constitution by ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a
superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with
ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall
please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the
constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are
absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power, in its own nature
illimitable.
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as
forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the
theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant
to the constitution, is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is consequently to
be considered, by this court, as one of the fundamental principles of our society.
[…]
If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it,
notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect? Or,
in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it
was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory […]
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and
province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a
fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning
of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an
irreconcilable difference variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and
validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or in other words, the Constitution ought to be
preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
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interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on
the operation of each.
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution
apply to a particular case, so that the court must decide that case conformably to the
law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding
the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case.
This is the very essence of judicial duty.
If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to
any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act,
must govern the case to which they both apply.40

VI. CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY IN CANADA
In Canada, the supremacy of the written constitution originally flowed from
the fact that the British North America Act of 186741 was an Imperial statute
extending to the colonial dominion. By the Colonial Laws Validity Act of
1865,42 any colonial law that was “repugnant to the Provisions” of any imperial
statute “extending to the colony” was “absolutely void and inoperative” to the
extent of the repugnancy. Although the Colonial Laws Validity Act was
repealed in its application to the dominions by the Statute of Westminster43 in
1931, at the request of Canada, section 7(1) of the statute preserved the preeminent position of the British North America Acts, 1867 to 1930. If Parliament
or a provincial legislature enacted a law that was ultra vires the legislative
authority of the enacting legislative body, then the repugnancy of the impugned
law with the British North America Act would result in a judicial declaration
that the law was void and inoperative.
With the patriation of the Constitution by operation of the Canada Act 1982,
the supremacy clause of the Constitution is now set out in the first subsection of
section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, in the following terms:
52. (1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that
is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the
inconsistency, of no force or effect.

Textual authority for constitutional judicial review in Canada now reposes,
therefore, in section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
________________________________________________________________
40
41
42
43

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), at 176-78. [Emphasis added.]
1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, now styled the Constitution Act, 1867.
1865 (U.K.), 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63.
1931 (U.K.), 22 Geo. V, c. 4.
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VII. THE TRIUMPH OF CONSTITUTIONALISM,
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
1. The Manitoba Language Rights Reference
An illustration of the operation of the principle of consti-tutionalism at the
heart of section 52 may be instructive. In the Manitoba Language Rights
Reference,44 the Supreme Court of Canada was faced with the difficult task of
declaring invalid almost 90 years of legislation enacted solely in English by the
legislature of Manitoba, in contravention of section 23 of the Manitoba Act,
1870,45 which requires the enactment, printing and publication of the Acts of
the legislature in English and in French. The difficulty arose principally from
the fact that a judicial declaration of invalidity of this magnitude threatened to
leave the province without any current laws or even a functioning legislature,
the members of the legislative assembly having themselves been elected and
the legislature summoned on the basis of unilingual, and hence invalid,
legislation.
The Supreme Court did not shrink from its constitutional duty. The
requirement of bilingual enactment was mandatory. The purpose — the
constitutional value — behind both section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 and
section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the Court stated, “was to ensure full
and equal access to the legislatures, the laws and the courts for francophones
and anglophones alike.”46 These fundamental guarantees “would be
meaningless and their entrenchment a futile exercise were they not
obligatory.”47 Section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 imposed a constitutional
duty on the legislature of the province with regard to the manner and form of its
legislation, and this duty protected “the substantive rights of all Manitobans to
equal access to the law”48 in English and in French. That constitutional duty,
the Court said, conferred upon the judiciary “the responsibility of protecting the
correlative language rights of all Manitobans including the Franco-Manitoban
minority.”49
The judiciary is the institution charged with the duty of ensuring that the
government complies with the Constitution. We must protect those whose

________________________________________________________________
44

Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721; per curiam. I was one of counsel in

this matter.
45
46
47
48
49

33 Vict., c. 3 (Can.).
Supra, note 44, at 739.
Id.
Id., at 744.
Id., at 744-45.
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constitutional rights have been violated, whomever they may be, and whatever the
reasons for the violation.50

On a more general plane, the Court then went on to make an eloquent
philosophical comment about constitutionalism and the role of constitutional
judicial review in Canada.
The Constitution of a country is a statement of the will of the people to be governed
in accordance with certain principles held as fundamental and certain prescriptions
restrictive of the powers of the legislature and government. It is, as s. 52 of the
Constitution Act, 1982 declares, the “supreme law” of the nation, unalterable by the
normal legislative process, and unsuffering of laws inconsistent with it. The duty of
the judiciary is to interpret and apply the laws of Canada and each of the
provinces, and it is thus our duty to ensure that the constitutional law prevails .51

“Since April 17, 1982,” the Court noted, “the mandate of the judiciary to
protect the Constitution has been embodied in s. 52 of the Constitution Act,
1982.”52 The Court reviewed the consequences of failure to comply with the
terms of the Constitution prior to 1982, under the jurisprudence developed
pursuant to the Colonial Laws Validity Act, and concluded:
Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 does not alter the principles which have
provided the foundation for judicial review over the years. In a case where
constitutional manner and form requirements have not been complied with, the
consequence of such non-compliance continues to be invalidity. The words “of no
force or effect” mean that a law thus inconsistent with the Constitution has no force
or effect because it is invalid.53

The Court next turned to an examination of the principle of the rule of law,
“a fundamental principle of our Constitution.” 54 Because the rule of law means
that the law is supreme over government and is, therefore, “preclusive of the
influence of arbitrary power,”55 it is this supremacy of the law, as embodied in
both section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 and section 52 of the Constitution
Act, 1982, that required the Court to “find the unconstitutional laws of
Manitoba to be invalid and of no force and effect.” 56 However, the notion of the
rule of law also carries with it a second, broader meaning: “the rule of law
________________________________________________________________
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id., at 745. [Emphasis added.]
Id. [Emphasis added.]
Id., at 745-46.
Id., at 746. [Emphasis added.]
Id., at 748.
Id.
Id., at 749.
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requires the creation and maintenance of an actual order of positive laws which
preserves and embodies the more general principle of normative order.”57
It was because of concern for this “second aspect of the rule of law” that the
Court was obliged to consider further the role of this principle. The Court
determined that the rule of law, so clearly a pillar of the English Constitution, 58
had become “a postulate of our own constitutional order” 59 through its implicit
incorporation in the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 and its explicit
mention in Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, the preamble to the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which declares:
Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God
and the rule of law: [Emphasis added.]

Beyond this, however, the Court underlined that the principle of the rule of
law “is clearly implicit in the very nature of a Constitution.” 60
The Constitution, as the Supreme Law, must be understood as a purposive ordering
of social relations providing a basis upon which an actual order of positive laws can
be brought into existence. The founders of this nation must have intended, as one of
the basic principles of nation building, that Canada be a society of legal order and
normative structure: one governed by rule of law. While this is not set out in a
specific provision, the principle of the rule of law is clearly a principle of our
Constitution.
The Court cannot take a narrow and literal approach to constitutional
interpretation. The jurisprudence of the Court evidences a willingness to
supplement textual analysis with historical, contextual and purposive interpretation
in order to ascertain the intent of the makers of our Constitution.61

The Court analyzed its earlier opinion in the Patriation Reference, in which
the principle of federalism had figured prominently in the majority‟s reasoning
as to the existence of a constitutional convention governing the degree of
consensus needed amongst federal and provincial actors to proceed with the
federal government‟s constitutional amendment resolution. “In other words,”
the Court stated, “in the process of Constitutional adjudication, the Court may
have regard to unwritten postulates which form the very foundation of the
________________________________________________________________
57

Id.
Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London:
MacMillan, 1959), especially Chapter IV, “The Rule of Law: Its Nature and General Applications”
(at 183-205).
59
Re Manitoba Language Rights, supra, note 44, at 750.
60
Id.
61
Id., at 750-51. [Emphasis added.]
58
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Constitution in Canada. In the case of the Patriation Reference, supra, this
unwritten postulate was the principle of federalism. In the present case it is the
principle of rule of law.”62
The Court stated that because of the legislature of Manitoba‟s “persistent
violation of the constitutional dictates”63 of section 23 of the Manitoba Act,
1870, “the Province of Manitoba is in a state of emergency”: 64 all unilingual
Acts of the legislature “are and always have been invalid and of no force or
effect.”65 However, because the Constitution “will not suffer a province without
laws,”66 temporary validity and force would be given to the current Acts of the
legislature for “the minimum period necessary for translation, re-enactment,
printing and publishing of the unilingual Acts” 67 in both languages. For any and
all future enactments, “the Constitution requires that, from the date of this
judgment, all new Acts of the Manitoba Legislature be enacted, printed and
published in both French and English. Any Acts of the Legislature that do not
meet this requirement will be invalid and of no force or effect.”68
________________________________________________________________
62

Id., at 752. Tellingly, in its analysis, the Court underscored a passage by Martland and
Ritchie JJ., who dissented in the Patriation Reference in that they would have found that provincial
consent to the patriation package was not only a requirement of constitutional convention but also
of constitutional law. Martland and Ritchie concluded that in the important series of cases in which
“judicially developed legal principles and doctrines” had been shaped, none of those principles is to
be found in the express provisions of the Constitution, and “they have been accorded full legal
force in the sense of being employed to strike down legislative enactments” (at 752 of the Manitoba
Language Rights Reference, citing the Patriation Reference). This characterization of the principles
as having “full legal force” was cited by the Court again in the Quebec Secession Reference for the
proposition that underlying constitutional principles “may in certain circumstances give rise to
substantive legal obligations” (at para. 54). Professor Hogg (“The Secession Reference: The Duty
to Negotiate” (1998 Constitutional Cases Conference, Osgoode Hall Law School, 16 April 1999), at
33-34) has chided the Court for incorporating into the “law of Canada” an obligation to negotiate
secession on the basis of the “vague principles of democracy and federalism,” and thus converting
“political reality into a legal rule.” He adds that “it is not entirely clear why it is a legal rule, since it
appears to have no legal sanctions.” However, this simply begs the question: is it truly a legal rule?
Although the duty to negotiate established by the Court in the Quebec Secession Reference (in my
view, on the basis of section 46 of the Constitution Act, 1982 construed in light of the democratic
principle) is characterized by the Court as a “constitutional obligation,” and would certainly have
“powerful normative force,” the Court stopped shy of calling it a legal obligation. The duty shares
some of the characteristics of a constitutional convention in that it is a binding obligation in the
political and constitutional sense, but it appears not to be enforceable as such by the courts as a
matter of law: vide paras. 98-102 of the Court‟s opinion.
63
Re Manitoba Language Rights, supra, note 44, at 766.
64
Id.
65
Id., at 767.
66
Id.
67
Id., at 768-69.
68
Id., at 768.
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2. The Quebec Secession Reference
There is no doubt that the Court‟s approach and reasoning in the Manitoba
Language Rights Reference was highly germane to its disposition of the
Quebec Secession Reference. It was no coincidence that the Court chose to
preface the Quebec Secession Reference with its opening words in the
Manitoba Language Rights Reference:
This Reference combines legal and constitutional questions of the utmost subtlety
and complexity with political questions of great sensitivity.69

In the Quebec Secession Reference, the Court rejected the argument
advanced by the amicus curiae that a constitutional principle of effectivity
could be established both through the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867
and through the second aspect of the constitutional principle of the rule of law
that had allowed the Court to avoid a legal vacuum in Manitoba. In other
words, this putative principle of effectivity would be there to fill the gap in the
constitutional structure that would be created by the unilateral secession of the
province. The similarity between the principle of the rule of law and the
principle of effectivity, it had been argued, was that “both attempt to refashion
the law to meet social reality.”70 But effectivity could not be taken as anything
more than a possible state of fact; cast as a legal principle, it would run
“contrary to the rule of law” in that it would amount to nothing more than “the
contention that the law may be broken as long as it can be broken
successfully.”71 This would be inimical to — indeed, the antithesis of — the
principle of constitutionalism itself, the “essence” of which, the Court had said,
was “embodied” in section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.72
________________________________________________________________
69
Id., at 728. These words were also employed by counsel for the Attorney General of
Canada to commence oral argument in the Quebec Secession Reference. For analysis of the
Reference from the perspective of federal counsel, see generally Bienvenu, “Secession by
Constitutional Means: The Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession
Reference” (New Zealand Law Conference, Rotorua, April 1999); Dawson, “Reflections on the
Opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference” (1999), 11 N.J.C.L.
5; and Newman, The Quebec Secession Reference: The Rule of Law and the Position of the
Attorney General of Canada (Toronto: York University Centre for Public Law and Public Policy,
1999). It is fair to say that counsel who represented the federal government in the reference, like
most commentators and observers, were highly impressed with the clarity and cogency of the
Court‟s reasoning in this pivotally important matter. In the latter book, I wrote that the ruling was
remarkably compelling in its wisdom and that the Court has been justly praised for its profoundly
intelligent and masterful handling of the issues.
70
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 145.
71
Id., at para. 108.
72
Id., at para. 72.
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The Court took great care to emphasize that what was done in the Manitoba
Language Rights Reference was done in pursuance of the constitutionalism
principle embodied in section 52:

[N]othing of our concern

in the Manitoba Language Rights Reference about the
severe practical consequences of unconstitutionality affected our conclusion that, as
a matter of law, all Manitoba legislation at issue in that case was unconstitutional.
The Court‟s declaration of unconstitutionality was clear and unambiguous. The
Court‟s concern with maintenance of the rule of law was directed in its relevant
aspect to the appropriate remedy, which in that case was to suspend the declaration
of invalidity to permit appropriate rectification to take place. 73

VIII. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND
THE FABRIC OF THE CONSTITUTION
Constitutional principles, then, can be employed in furtherance of the
provisions of the Constitution. Seen in this light, it is not so much that they “fill
gaps,” but rather that they extend the threads of the existing fabric of the
Constitution in circumstances where the principles are tightly interwoven with
the meaning of the textual provisions themselves. Deftly handled, they can
perform an important (and in some cases, essential) role in bringing the terms
of the Constitution to life and in allowing it to respond to unforeseen situations
in a way that maintains the normative order, federal structure and democratic
character of our constitutional system, while, as in the Manitoba Language
Rights Reference, keeping faith with the protection of minorities.
This is also consistent with the approach that our Supreme Court signalled it
would be adopting in the earliest cases under the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. “Narrow and technical interpretation, if not modulated by a
sense of the unknowns of the future, can stunt the growth of the law and hence
the community it serves.”74 An entrenched bill of rights like the Charter calls
for a “broad, purposive analysis, which interprets specific provisions of a
constitutional document in the light of its larger objects” and which avoids
what has been called “the austerity of tabulated legalism.” 75 Chief Justice
Dickson‟s words in Hunter v. Southam echoed those of Chief Justice Marshall
________________________________________________________________
73

Id., at para. 145.
Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinger, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, at 366, per Estey J.,
“[The Charter] cannot be readily amended. The fine and constant adjustment process of these
constitutional provisions is left by a tradition of necessity to the judicial branch. Flexibility must be
balanced with certainty.”
75
Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 156, per Dickson J. (as he then was).
74
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almost two centuries earlier.76 We must never forget that we are expounding a
constitution. Constitutional principles play an essential role in that exposition,
balancing the constitutional text with constitutional meaning.

IX. PRINCIPLES IN THE BALANCE
The principles of judicial independence, federalism, the rule of law and the
protection of minorities are quite familiar to constitutional lawyers, and their
textual and jurisprudential bases have been well-canvassed in the Provincial
Judges Reference and the Quebec Secession Reference. It should be mentioned,
however, that those are clearly not the only basic principles of the Constitution,
nor the sole rules of constitutional interpretation.77 Other key principles and
values include the principle of parliamentary sovereignty78 (which, although
________________________________________________________________

76
Id., at 155: “The task of expounding a constitution is crucially different from that of
construing a statute. [...] Its function is to provide a continuing framework for the legitimate
exercise of governmental power and, when joined by a Bill or a Charter of Rights, for the
unremitting protection of individual rights and liberties. Once enacted, its provisions cannot easily
be repealed or amended. It must, therefore, be capable of growth and development over time to
meet new social, political and historical realities often unimagined by its framers. The judiciary is
the guardian of the constitution and must, in interpreting its provisions, bear these considerations in
mind.” [Emphasis added.]
77
There is an unfortunate tendency in some of the recent decisions of the lower courts to
speak of federalism, democracy, the rule of law and constitutionalism, and the protection of
minorities as the four basic pillars of the Constitution. While these principles are certainly
foundational or structural (the Quebec Secession Reference opinion calls them “fundamental and
organizing principles”), the Supreme Court was quite clear in emphasizing that these principles
were those that were “relevant to addressing the question before us,” and that “this enumeration is
by no means exhaustive” (para. 32 of the Court‟s opinion in the Quebec Secession Reference).
78
“By way of contrast [to the determination of issues relating to justiciability in the
Charter context], in the residual area reserved for the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty in
Canadian constitutional law, it is Parliament and the legislatures, not the courts, that have ultimate
constitutional authority to draw the boundaries. It is the prerogative of a sovereign Parliament to
make its intention known as to the role the courts are to play in interpreting, applying and enforcing
its statutes. [...] That the executive through its control of a House of Commons majority may in
practice dictate the position the House of Commons takes on the scope of Parliament‟s auditing
function is not [...] constitutionally cognizable by the judiciary. The grundnorm with which the
courts must work in this context is that of the sovereignty of Parliament. The ministers of the
Crown hold office with the grace of the House of Commons and any position taken by the majority
must be taken to reflect the sovereign will of Parliament. Where Parliament has indicated in the
Auditor General Act that it wishes its own servant to report to it on denials of access to information
needed to carry out his functions on Parliament‟s behalf, it would not be appropriate for this Court
to consider granting remedies for such denials, if they, in fact, exist” (Canada (Auditor General) v.
Canada (Minister of Energy, Mines & Resources), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 49, at 91, 103-04), per Dickson
C. J. for the Court. See also Reference re Canada Assistance Plan (British Columbia), [1991] 2
S.C.R. 525.
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attenuated by the limits on federal and provincial legislative power imposed by
the provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, remains an
essential feature of our constitutional structure); parliamentary privileges;
constitutional conventions relating to the principles of responsible government,
including the convention of political neutrality of the public service; 79 certain
doctrines flowing from the federal principle, such as the paramountcy doctrine;
important common law and administrative law rules relating variously to the
Crown prerogative, due process, natural justice and procedural fairness; and the
basic precepts and underlying tenets of most of the provisions now entrenched
in the Charter of Rights itself.80
In the Quebec Secession Reference, the Court recognized the need to balance
the principles at play in that case. “These defining principles,” the Court
affirmed, “function in symbiosis. No single principle can be defined in isolation
from the others, nor does any one principle trump or exclude the operation of
any other.”81 This balancing of principles has raised concerns in some quarters
because, as Professor Patrick Monahan has put it, a “judicial balancing” theory
seems at odds with the traditional role of judicial interpretation of existing text,
________________________________________________________________
79
OPSEU v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2; Osborne v. Canada (Treasury
Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 69.
80
As regards the Charter, the principles and values underlying basic liberties such as
freedom of conscience and religion; freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression; peaceful
assembly and association in section 2; democracy and representative government in sections 3 to 5;
citizenship and freedom of movement in section 6; principles of fundamental justice in section 7;
due process and protections relating to search and seizure, arrest, detention and imprisonment, as
well as other common law principles relating to criminal and penal matters in sections 8 to 14; not
only formal but also substantive equality before and under the law and the right to equal protection
and benefit of the law without discrimination in section 15; formal and substantive equality in
relation to the official languages of Canada in sections 16 to 23 and the principle of advancement of
equality in section 16(3); the right to a just and appropriate, court-ordered remedy under section 24;
recognition of the interplay between the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter and those of
the aboriginal peoples of Canada in section 25; other rights and freedoms in section 26; the
multicultural heritage of Canadians in section 27; equality of the sexes in section 28; and rights
respecting denominational schools in section 29, respectively. All of the rights and freedoms set out
in the Charter are expressed in section 1 as being guaranteed “subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” In discussing
section 1 of the Charter in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at 136, Dickson C.J. stated:
The Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a free and democratic
society which I believe embody, to name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of
beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions
which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society. The underlying values
and principles of a free and democratic society are the genesis of the rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Charter and the ultimate standard against which a limit on a right or
freedom must be shown, despite its effect, to be reasonable and demonstrably justified.
81
Quebec Secession Reference, supra, note 70, at para. 49.

Job Name: SCLR14

Time:00:19

1st proofs Date:Saturday, February 11, 2012

(2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d)

The Role of Constitutional Principles

217

in that the former “asks the judiciary to balance for themselves underlying
constitutional values and to choose the balance that they believe most
appropriate.” This, he continues, “fails to distinguish the interpretation of text
from its creation” and puts the courts in the role of constitutional drafters. It
may be, states Professor Monahan, not implausibly, that the constitutional text
itself invites the courts in certain cases to ascribe a higher value, or primacy, to
certain norms and principles as reflected in the written provisions themselves,
and that the role of the courts in such circumstances is not to choose a different
balance but to give effect to the underlying logic of the text. 82 To what extent,
for example, can the principle of the rule of law and the supremacy of the
provisions of the Constitution, as declared in section 52(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982, be “balanced” without saying, in effect, that the Constitution‟s
supremacy is not absolute? A relativist view of constitutional supremacy might
risk undermining the very object of a written constitution (and
constitutionalism itself): to prescribe the basic rules of government in a superior
and paramount law. It could become a very slippery slope, indeed, and would
raise difficult questions about the role of the courts and the legitimacy of
judicial review.
In a subsequent piece,83 Professor Monahan suggests that a “necessary
implication” approach to unwritten principles, as evidenced notably by the
reasoning of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal in the Hogan case,84 could
point to a more prudent path, on the theory that the courts would be permitted
to have regard to unwritten constitutional principles “only where such
principles are necessarily implied by the constitutional text”:
Implicit principles are those that flow logically or of necessity from the terms of the
written constitution. They must be assumed by the existing text to be
constitutionally guaranteed and are therefore required in order to give proper effect
to the text itself.85

1. The Hogan Case
The Hogan case involved a challenge to the validity of the Constitution
Amendment, 1998 (Newfoundland Act), which was enacted under the amending
procedure set out in section 43 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The amendment
________________________________________________________________

82
Monahan, “The Public Policy Role of the Supreme Court in the Secession Reference”
(1999), 11 N.J.C.L. 65, at 77-80.
83
Monahan, “The Legal Framework Governing Secession in Light of the Quebec
Secession Reference” (Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures 2000, 8-9 June 2000).
84
Hogan v. Newfoundland (Attorney General) (2000), 183 D.L.R. (4th) 225 (Nfld. C.A.)
85
Monahan, supra, note 83, at 12. [Emphasis added.]
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modified Term 17 of the Terms of Union between Canada and Newfoundland,
which terms are scheduled to the Newfoundland Act, itself a part of the
Constitution of Canada. The amendment had the effect of abrogating
denominational school rights and privileges in the province, and its validity was
challenged on several grounds, including the argument that it infringed the
constitutional principles of the rule of law and the protection of minorities as
well as an obligation to negotiate, in light of the Quebec Secession Reference.
The Attorneys General for Newfoundland and Canada contended for the
legality of the amendment. In extensive reasons for judgment, the Court of
Appeal in Hogan86 upheld the validity of the amendment, notably on the basis
that the applicable amending procedure set out in the provisions of the
Constitution was clear, and its terms had been complied with. The Court of
Appeal stated, inter alia:
In interpreting the Constitution of Canada, one cannot ignore the history of its
development. [...] However, the fact that we now have constitutional documents to
which we can refer collectively as the Constitution does not eliminate all reference
to our largely unwritten constitutional past. Not every nuance of the powers of the
different heads of government, for example, is written in the Constitution. Even
with a written document, certain underlying assumptions will be seen as being selfevident and of constitutional stature. The New Brunswick Broadcasting case
required the Court to express what was unwritten. Here the appellants would have
this Court defeat a constitutionally mandated process by reference to the
“fundamental or original principles.” However, unlike the Provincial Court Judges
Reference or the New Brunswick Broadcasting case, here the Court is being asked
to read in requirements, not to confirm some long-accepted unwritten principle of
the Constitution but to limit the application of the amending provisions to a right
that was granted by the written Constitution. This is not a case where the unwritten
assumptions of educational rights need to be stated by the Courts. The rights are
fully explored and stated in Term 17. Term 17 is a complete statement of
denominational education rights. No other term written or unwritten of the
Constitution need be called upon to interpret Term 17 or to determine how it should
be amended. Neither the rule of law nor respect for minorities prevents the
application of s. 43 to the amendment of Term 17. [...] The appropriate provision in
Part V of the Constitution having been complied with, the validity of the
amendment to Term 17 cannot be questioned.87

________________________________________________________________
86

The original statement of claim invoked the purported existence of constitutional
conventions in this regard, but with the advent of the Supreme Court of Canada‟s decision in the
Quebec Secession Reference, the challenge was broadened to include argument based on
constitutional principles. Riche J.‟s reasons at trial are predicated on the question of constitutional
conventions (an argument he rejected), and the appellants did not pursue the conventions issue on
appeal, focussing instead on principles.
87
Hogan, supra, note 84, at para. 125.
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2. The Brown, Bacon and Westergarde-Thorpe Cases
The approach of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal in the Hogan case,
however, is basically consistent with the findings of the Alberta and
Saskatchewan Courts of Appeal in the Brown and Bacon cases, respectively,
and that of the Federal Court of Appeal in Westergard-Thorpe. In Brown, the
Court of Appeal agreed with the position of the Attorney General of Canada
that the applicant, in seeking a judicial declaration that the appointment of
Senators by the Governor General in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution Act, 1867 was contrary to democratic principle, was attempting to
use the courts to pronounce upon a non-justiciable issue.
We agree with the Crown that the appellant “seeks to invoke the democratic
principle, per se, divorced of its interpretive role and devoid of legal issues, simply
because a declaratory order from the Court would, in his view, „have considerable
persuasive effect, and it would confer democratic legitimacy on the Senatorial
Selection Act.‟ ”88

In Bacon and Westergard-Thorpe, the appellate courts refused to accept the
contention that statutory provisions enacted by the legislature of Saskatchewan
and by the Parliament of Canada, respectively, should be invalidated on the
basis of an expansive view89 of the principle of the rule of law, in circumstances
where there was no breach of the Charter of Rights, and where the provisions
were not ultra vires — in other words, where there was no breach of section 52
of the Constitution Act, 1982 as concerned the provisions of the Constitution. In
upholding the impugned legislation, the courts gave effect to another
constitutional principle: parliamentary supremacy. Wrote Wakeling J.A. for the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Bacon,90 the protection afforded by the rule
of law in a democratic country is twofold: protection “by our courts against
________________________________________________________________
88

Brown v. Alberta (1999), 177 D.L.R. (4th) 349, at para. 25 (Alta. C.A.).
This approach suggests that beyond the generally accepted purview of the rule of law as
a guarantee against arbitrary governmental action, and of the principle that laws should be made
according to law and not otherwise (in other words, respect for manner and form requirements and
orderly processes in law-making), the rule of law should also englobe a substantive protection
against purported arbitrariness by Parliament or a legislature in enacting laws that abrogate
previous contractual undertakings by government or that remove related causes of action and thus
ancillary access to the courts for redress. Vide Monahan, “Is the Pearson Airport Legislation
Unconstitutional?: The Rule of Law as a Limit on Contract Repudiation by Government” (1995),
33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 411. However, see Hogg and Monahan, Liability of the Crown, 3rd ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 2000), at 223, for some sober second thoughts on this approach in light of
Bacon (and other cases).
90
Bacon v. Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corp. (1999), 180 Sask. R. 20, 205 W.A.C. 20
(C.A.).
89
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arbitrary and unlawful actions by officials,” and “protection against arbitrary
legislation […] by the democratic process” of calling legislators to account
through the ballot box. Thus, the principle of the rule of law posits “the law as
it exists from time to time.” It “does not create a restriction on Parliament‟s
right to make laws;” it is, rather, a recognition that when laws are made, “they
are then applicable to all, including governments.”91 Wakeling J.A. prefaced
those remarks with this comment on the Quebec Secession Reference:
I am unable to accept that these justices of the Supreme Court, whilst providing an
analysis of our federal system, were at the same time engaged in changing that
system. This is particularly so when we are not talking of a subtle or marginal
change, but one which would reduce the supremacy of Parliament by subjecting it
to the scrutiny of superior court judges to be sure it did not offend the rule of law
and if it did, to determine whether it was an arbitrary action. 92

Strayer J.A., writing for the Federal Court of Appeal in Westergard-Thorpe,
“respectfully agreed” with that observation. The rule of law requires that “the
relationship between the state and the individual must be regulated by law.” 93
This principle should not be construed as “having put an end to another
constitutional principle, namely the supremacy of Parliament or the supremacy
of legislatures when acting in their own domain.” 94 In other words, in these
cases, the courts balanced the principle of the rule of law with that of
parliamentary supremacy.

X. A DELICATE BALANCE
The delicate balance achieved by the courts in construing constitutional
principles — whether inter se or with reference to the textual provisions of the
Constitution — is, as I have argued earlier in this paper, a means of ensuring a
necessary margin of flexibility in the application of the terms of the formal
Constitution and their adaptation to new or changing circumstances. Like all
tools of construction, however, constitutional principles have their limits. A
healthy tension will likely continue to exist between the need, on the one hand,
to understand constitutional principles as flowing from the words, meaning and
interpretation of the constitutional text, and the evident desire, on the other
hand (in specified circumstances), to give those principles virtually the force of
________________________________________________________________
91

Id., at para. 30.
Id., at para. 29.
93
Singh v. Canada (Attorney General) (sub nom. Westergard-Thorpe v. Canada (Attorney
General)), [2000] 3 F.C. 185, at paras. 33, 35 (C.A.).
94
Id., at para. 12.
92
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constitutional provisions themselves. This contrast between deductive and
inductive reasoning in relation to constitutional principles reached its zenith in
the Provincial Judges Reference. For Chief Justice Lamer, the preamble to the
Constitution Act, 1867 “recognizes and affirms the basic principles which are
the very source of the substantive provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867.”
Those provisions, he added, “merely elaborate those organizing principles.” 95
For Mr. Justice La Forest, the provisions of the Constitution are not simply
elaborations upon unwritten principles; rather, the provisions “are the
Constitution.”96 While La Forest J. did not deny that the Constitution “embraces
unwritten rules, including rules that find expression in the preamble of the
Constitution Act, 1867,” in his opinion, “these rules really find their origin in
specific provisions of the Constitution viewed in light of our constitutional
heritage. In other words, what we are concerned with is the meaning to be
attached to an expression used in a constitutional provision.” 97

XI. LEGAL CERTAINTY AND THE
LEGITIMACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Chief Justice Lamer did, however, make an important proviso regarding the
role of constitutional principles. He declared:
However, I do wish to add a note of caution. As I said in New Brunswick
Broadcasting, supra, at p. 355, the constitutional history of Canada can be
understood, in part, as a process of evolution “which [has] culminated in the
supremacy of a definitive written constitution.” There are many important reasons
for the preference for a written constitution over an unwritten one, not the least of
which is the promotion of legal certainty and through it the legitimacy of
constitutional judicial review.98

La Forest J. also underscored the point that the legitimacy of judicial review
depends upon “the interpretation of an authoritative constitutional
instrument.”99 This legitimacy is jeopardized, in his view, “when courts attempt
________________________________________________________________
95

Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island;
Reference re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward
Island; R. v. Campbell; R. v. Ekmcic; R. v. Wickman; Manitoba Provincial Court Judges Assn. v.
Manitoba (Minister of Justice), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 95, per Lamer C.J. (emphasis added).
96
Id., at para. 319 (emphasis in reasons of La Forest J.).
97
Id., at para. 303.
98
Id., at para. 93. “[T]hese concerns,” added Lamer C.J., “go to the heart” of
constitutionalism itself.
99
Id., at para. 315.
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to limit the power of legislatures without recourse to express textual
authority.”100
In the Quebec Secession Reference, a unanimous Court repeated Chief
Justice Lamer‟s caution in the Provincial Judges Reference in the following
terms:
In the Provincial Judges Reference, supra, at paras. 93 and 104, we cautioned that
the recognition of these constitutional principles (the majority opinion referred to
them as “organizing principles” and described one of them, judicial independence,
as an “unwritten norm”) could not be taken as an invitation to dispense with the
written text of the Constitution. On the contrary, we confirmed that there are
compelling reasons to insist upon the primacy of our written constitution. A written
constitution promotes legal certainty and predictability, and it provides a
foundation and a touchstone for the exercise of constitutional judicial review. 101

These twin issues of certainty in the law and the legitimacy of judicial
review (as well as their linkage with a written constitution) are not new; nor are
they limited to the Canadian experience. As we have seen, Chief Justice
Marshall of the American Supreme Court confronted them in Marbury v.
Madison almost 200 years ago, and the principle of judicial review triumphed
on the basis of the need to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution‟s
provisions over the ordinary laws of Congress. The same issues have arisen in
________________________________________________________________
100

Id., at para. 316. La Forest J. goes on to invoke the principles of democracy and
parliamentary supremacy in examining various dicta by members of the Court over the years
(especially prior to the Charter) that have suggested that the curtailment of political expression by
Parliament or by the provincial legislatures would be ultra vires them both. While neither
approving nor rejecting the so-called “implied bill of rights” theory, he denied that it could justify
resort to the preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867 in the context of judicial independence.
“Although it has been suggested that guarantees of political freedom flow from the preamble, [...]
this position is untenable. The better view is that if these guarantees exist, they are implicit in s. 17
of the Constitution Act, 1867, which provides for the establishment of Parliament; [...] More
important, the justification for implied political freedoms is that they are supportive, and not
subversive, of legislative supremacy. That doctrine holds that democratically constituted
legislatures, and not the courts, are the ultimate guarantors of civil liberties, including the right to
an independent judiciary” (at para. 318).
101
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 53. In Re Eurig Estate,
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 565, at para. 66, Mr. Justice Binnie observed: “As the Court recently affirmed in
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, implicit principles can and should be used
to expound the Constitution, but they cannot alter the thrust of its explicit text.” Binnie J., writing
for himself and McLachlin J. (as she then was), demurred from his colleague Justice Major‟s
interpretation of the purpose of section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867 on the basis of a principle
of strict construction to the effect that taxation powers cannot arise incidentally in delegated
legislation.
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France102 and Australia in recent years, 103 for example, as these nations‟ judges
have attempted to infuse the constitutions of their countries with constitutional
principles and an implied bill of rights (in the case of France, “principes à
valeur constitutionnelle”104 derived from the preamble to the Constitution of the
Fifth Republic and incorporating the Déclaration des droits de l’homme of
1789). The same issues will no doubt face the Appellate Committee of the
House of Lords and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, respectively,
in the interpretation and application of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42) on
the one hand, and of the UK devolution statutes  the Government of Wales
Act 1998 (c. 38), the Scotland Act 1998 (c. 46), and the Northern Ireland Act
1998 (c. 47)  on the other.105
1. The French Experience
Professor Dominique Turpin argues persuasively that in France, like a good
Beaujolais, “le droit constitutionnel nouveau est arrivé,” that is to say, constitutional
law which takes into account the jurisprudence flowing from the increased activity
of the Conseil constitutionnel, and which has had the effect of enlarging the scope
of constitutional law as well as progressively constitutionalizing all branches of law.
Nor is this simply a case of pouring new wine into old bottles.
Quel politiste pourrait aujourd‟hui ignorer l‟incontestable «saisine de la politique
par le droit» dans la mesure où, d‟une part, des textes sont enfins venus réglementer
ce qui était jadis au-delà du droit […] et où, d‟autre part, le juge constitutionnel se

________________________________________________________________
102

Vide Turpin, Droit constitutionnel, 4th ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1999); Drago, François, Molfessis (eds.), La légitimité de la jurisprudence du Conseil
constitutionnel (Paris: Editions Economica, 1999): “Depuis plus d‟un quart de siècle, le contrôle de
constitutionnalité connâit un développement sans précédent en France, sous l‟égide d‟un Conseil
constitutionnel s‟étant proclamé gardien des droits et libertés constitutionnelles” (at v). Indeed, the
growth of constitutional judicial review throughout Europe is a significant phenomenon and a
common trait: Rousseau, La justice constitutionnelle en Europe, 3rd ed. (Paris: Montchrestien,
1998).
103
Vide Hanks and Cass, Australian Constitutional Law: Materials and Commentary, 6th
ed. (Sydney: Butterworths, 1999). “One effect of the High Court‟s recent bout of activism has been
to engender a debate within the Australian community concerning the proper limits of judicial
activism, or law-making” (at 19).
104
Turpin, supra, note 102, at 111. For a lucid analysis of the legal weight and content of
the preamble and the jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel in this regard, see pp. 104-15.
105
Vide Le Sueur and Cornes, What Do the Top Courts Do? (London: Constitution Unit,
School of Public Policy, University College London, 2000); Newman, “Adjudicating Divisions of
Powers Issues: A Canadian Perspective” (London and Edinburgh Seminars on Reforming the UK‟s
Top Courts: Lessons From Comparative Policy, Economic and Social Research Council‟s Future
Governance Programme, July 2001).
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trouve désormais placé au coeur des controverses politiques, obligeant les acteurs
de ce jeu à formuler de plus en plus leurs interventions en termes juridiques? De ce
nouvel état découlent trois séries de conséquences, relatives à la nature même du
droit constitutionnel (qui est bouleversée), à son champ d‟application (qui est
élargi) et à sa place vis-à-vis les autres branches du droit (qui est rehaussée).
Quant à la nature du droit constitutionnel, il s‟agit bien d‟un retour au texte (et aux
«principes à valeur constitutionnelle»), mais tel qu‟il est interprété par un organe
extérieur au jeu politique […] doté d‟une légitimité technique désormais supérieure
à la légitimité démocratique de la majorité. […]
Quant au champ d‟application du droit constitutionnel, il s‟est nécessairement
élargi, dépassant la simple description du fonctionnement des institutions étatiques
[…] pour englober les sources du droit, tant privé que public d‟ailleurs, et tant
national que local […] ou international […] mais aussi, du fait de l‟insertion du
préambule dans la Constitution, la protection des libertés publiques. […]
Quant au rang du droit constitutionnel par rapport aux autres branches du droit, il ne
peut être aujourd‟hui que le premier. Après être demeuré, trop longtemps, un infra- ou
un sous-droit par défaut de sanction effective de ses prescriptions au temps de la
«souveraineté parlementaire», le droit constitutionnel a non seulement rattrapé les
autres branches du droit mais, en même temps, les domine dans une certaine
mesure.106

This development raises, in turn, questions about legitimacy (questions of
the sort that concerned La Forest J. in the Provincial Judges Reference).
Professor Dominique Rousseau has captured these questions well:
Dans la tradition démocratique «classique», le principe de légitimité consacré dans
tous les textes constitutionnels modernes est en effet la souveraineté populaire.
Titulaire du pouvoir, le peuple est, en démocratie, au principe de toutes choses: il
décide, il délègue, il sanctionne, il contrôle, il juge, mais il ne peut être lui-même
jugé, sanctionné ou contrôlé. Car s‟il pouvait l‟être, il faudrait nécessairement poser
l‟existence «au-dessus» du peuple d‟un lieu où se trouvent les valeurs, les règles de
jugement des actions du peuple. En démocratie, le peuple, c‟est la Cour suprême,
pour paraphraser le général de Gaulle.
Or, dans son principe, la justice constitutionnelle s‟inscrit contre cette conception-là
de la démocratie puisqu‟elle se définit comme le pouvoir donné à des personnes
nommées d‟apprécier, de contrôler et le cas échéant, de sanctionner la conformité à la
constitution des actes pris par les pouvoirs publics et en particulier, des lois votées par
les représentants élus du peuple souverain. […]

________________________________________________________________
106

Turpin, supra, note 102, at 5-7.
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La justice constitutionnelle inaugure ainsi une formidable mutation politique et, en
même temps, provoque une formidable renouveau de la théorie et de la philosophie
juridique et politique: qui dit le droit? Le droit peut-il être «arraché» à la
souveraineté populaire? La loi cède-elle devant la jurisprudence? Comment se
«fait» la jurisprudence? Est-ce la consécration d‟une religion ou d‟une
métaphysique juridique?…107

2. The Australian Experience
In Australia, the Commonwealth Constitution is a written text, including a
preamble and eight chapters forming the body of the Constitution. The preamble
recites that the people have agreed to unite in one indissoluble federal
Commonwealth under the Crown. This is understood as incorporating concepts of
popular legitimacy, federalism and constitutional monarchy. In their very useful and
exhaustive study, Professors Peter Hanks and Deborah Cass inform us that in
addition to the text, “the Constitution also contains principles which are said to
derive from its structure and purpose.”108 These principles include responsible
government, federalism, representative democracy and the separation of powers, all
of which are said to be reflected, although not explicitly set out, in the text. The
Constitution‟s history and the overlay of judicial interpretation on the text are also
crucial to the content of the Constitution. For example, Hanks and Cass note that
“one of the major constitutional issues for the High Court over the years has been
the question of whether the principle of federalism mandates full unification or only
integration of Australian institutions.”109 The way in which the federal principle is
construed and applied by the Court can thus have “a profound effect on the shape of
constitutional outcomes.”110 As in Canada, the United States and elsewhere,
textualism, originalism (or intentionalism) and dynamism (or progressivism or
organicism) vie for dominance. “Each method of constitutional interpretation has its
problems,” and “[n]o judge is totally committed to one method of interpretation
over another.”111 Nor is the choice of interpretative method simply an academic
question:

________________________________________________________________
107

Rousseau, supra, note 102, at 9-11.
Supra, note 103, at 5; emphasis in original. (Hanks is now a barrister, but for three
decades taught at Monash and Sydney Universities; Cass is a senior lecturer at the Faculty of Law,
Australian National University.)
109
Id., at 6.
110
Id.
111
Id., at 9.
108
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It has broad-ranging practical effects because it signals, especially to the wider
community, the nature of the role the High Court plays in legal and political
affairs.112

Hanks and Cass suggest that the role which the High Court has played in the
evolution of constitutional law in Australia has been “essential to its survival.”
In light of the rigidity of the constitutional amendment process, “it has been
judicial interpretation and re-interpretation which has managed to keep the
structure of government, as expressed in the Constitution, in touch with the
demands of a changing society and developing economy.” 113 Hanks and Cass
later cite commentator Brian Galligan114 for the proposition that Sir Owen
Dixon‟s classic plea, upon acceding to the position of Chief Justice, for “close
adherence to legal reasoning” and a “strict and complete legalism,” 115 has in
fact “been championed by the Court because it is an effective political strategy
for exercising judicial review”116 in a country essentially hostile to that
function, notably because of a tradition of parliamentary supremacy inherited
from Britain.
The High Court‟s decisions in 1992 in Nationwide News Pty. Ltd v. Wills117
and Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth118 were of great
significance for the recent development of Australian constitutional law. In those
cases, a majority of the Court held that principles of representative and
responsible government were implied in the Constitution, which in turn,
therefore, required freedom of communication in regard to political matters.
Moreover, Commonwealth and state legislation found in violation of those
principles would be held invalid.
To quote from the concurring opinion of Brennan J., the principles of
representative democracy, direct popular election, the national character of the
lower House and the principle of responsible government are “constitutional
________________________________________________________________
112

Id. For a timely and thoughtful discussion of originalism and other schools of thought in
the Canadian context, see the recent article by my colleague Luanne Walton, “Making Sense of
Constitutional Interpretation” (2001), 12:3 N.J.C.L. 315.
113
Id., at 31. This has particular resonance in Canada.
114
Galligan, “Realistic „Realism‟ and the High Court‟s Political Role” (1989), 18 Federal
L.R. 40.
115
Dixon C.J. is cited in Hanks and Cass, supra, note 103, at 32. Vide: (1952) 85 C.L.R.
xiv. (See also the discussion in Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Scarborough, Ont.:
Carswell, 1997), at 129-30).
116
Galligan, supra, note 114. Galligan in turn, has been criticized by Jeffrey Goldsworthy
for oversimplifying the Court‟s jurisprudence over 90 years as well as the complexities of
constitutional adjudication: Goldsworthy, “Realism about the High Court” (1989), 18 Federal L.R.
27.
117
(1992) 177 C.L.R. 1.
118
(1992) 177 C.L.R. 106.
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imperatives” intended to make both the legislative and executive branches of
government “ultimately answerable to the Australian people.”119
Under the Westminster model, these principles might be trespassed upon by
legislation emanating from an omnicompetent Parliament but the Parliament of the
Commonwealth is incompetent to alter the principles prescribed by the Constitution
to which it owes its existence. It is a Constitution the text of which the people alone
can change: s. 128.
To sustain a representative democracy embodying the principles prescribed by the
Constitution, freedom of public discussion of political and economic matters is
essential […]120

Noting Hanks and Cass, these decisions “were seen at the time as opening
the way for a judicially constructed Bill of Rights for Australia,” 121 which has
neither a constitutionally-entrenched Charter of Rights nor a statutory Bill of
Rights (as has existed for Canada since 1960 and for New Zealand since 1990).
These constitutional principles (or “constitutional implications”) however, were
qualified in later cases122 as being more in the nature of a fetter on legislative
action (a negative restraint) rather than a source of positive rights. The implied
freedom of communication, writes Sir Anthony Mason, was also “tied […]
more closely to the express provisions of the Constitution.” 123
Sir Anthony makes the case (as does Professor Monahan in Canada) for a
“necessary implications” test in construing and applying constitutional
principles.
Implication is a natural and necessary incident of the process of interpretation,
whether it is a constitution, a statute or a contract that is being interpreted. […]
That is not to say that implications are freely made. On the contrary, courts are
cautious about making implications. They are only made when they give

________________________________________________________________
119

Per Brennan J. in Nationwide News, supra, note 117, at 47.
Id. It is interesting to note that extensive reference is made to the classic jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court of Canada in this area, including Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R.
100; Saumur v. Quebec (City), [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299; and Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 285.
(The majority judgment in Nationwide News is made up of a series of concurring opinions; see also,
most notably, Mason C.J. and Deane and Toohey JJ., respectively.)
121
Hanks and Cass, supra, note 103, at 904.
122
Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104; Lange v.
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520. See also Leeth v. Commonwealth
(1992) 174 C.L.R. 455; Kruger v. Commonwealth (1997) 146 A.L.R. 126.
123
The Hon. Sir Anthony Mason, “The Role of the Judiciary in Developing Human Rights
in Australian Law” in Kinley, ed., Human Rights in Australian Law: Principles, Practice and
Potential (Leichhardt, N.S.W.: Federation Press, 1998), Chapter 2, at 38, referring particularly to
the Lange decision.
120
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expression to the intention of the relevant instrument as that intention is revealed by
reference to its language considered in the light of context (including history) and
the nature and purpose of the instrument.
That is why reference is made to “necessary implications,” indicating that an
implication is not made unless it is necessary. Here, however, a distinction must be
drawn between the making of an implication based simply on a manifestation of
intention to be gathered from the provisions of the Constitution, in which event one
is concerned only to ascertain whether that intention is manifested, and an
implication based on the structure of the Constitution. In the latter case the
implication must be logically or practically necessary for the preservation of the
integrity of that structure.124

Sir Anthony concludes that with the notable exception of the implied freedom
of communication (itself quite singular in nature and distinguishable from other
human rights because it is “representation-reinforcing, necessitated by the system
of representative (and responsible) government for which the Constitution by its
very provisions and structures provides”125), “little has been achieved by the High
Court in implying human rights protection in the Constitution.”126
In the ultimate analysis, this is because the Australian Constitution is an instrument
which defines the structure of government and distributes the power of government
rather than one which defines rights and freedoms in conformity with the British
parliamentary tradition and the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. 127

Nonetheless, the dynamic school of interpretation has been and no doubt will
continue to be one of the important contending approaches of Australian
constitutional law, as exemplified by the statement of Isaacs J. that
constitutions are “made, not for a single occasion, but for the continued life and
progress of the community,” and are shaped by the “silent operation of
constitutional principles,”128 as well as that of Windeyer J., who wrote:
In any country where the spirit of the common law holds sway the enunciation by
courts of constitutional principles based on the interpretation of a written
constitution may vary and develop in response to changing circumstances.129

________________________________________________________________
124

Id., at 36-37.
Id., at 41.
126
Id., at 37.
127
Id.
128
Commonwealth v. Kreglinger and Furnau Ltd. (1926) 37 C.L.R. 393, at 413.
129
Victoria v. Commonwealth (1971) 122 C.L.R. 353, at 396. (For ease of reference, I
should note that both Isaacs and Windeyer JJ.‟s remarks are drawn from Hanks and Cass,
125
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XII. CONCLUSION
1. The Necessary Linkage Between Constitutional Law and Principles
Returning now to Canada and to Canadian law, I will begin to hazard some
final observations and conclusions. Our country‟s constitutional edifice has been
built up to a high level of development, where the structure is indisputably more
evident, tangible and complete than it was in former times.
The 1982 reform brought with it not only the landmark addition of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but also long-overdue recognition
of aboriginal and treaty rights, confirmation of provincial control over natural
resources, plenary power to amend the Constitution‟s provisions in Canada
(through written amending procedures), a constitutional supremacy clause and,
perhaps most significantly, formal recognition in the Canada Act 1982 of
Canada‟s full and sovereign status as an independent nation. These major
structural developments have been overlaid upon the basic division of
legislative powers and the other essential features of legislative, executive and
judicial power and historic guarantees that comprise the original British-North
America Act: the Constitution Act, 1867.
Since 1982, two further attempts at major constitutional reform have failed to
be ratified, but a number of more modest constitutional amendments have been
enacted. Canada has also overcome an unprecedented threat to its constitutional
integrity, legal order and the rule of law, in a manner that permits the legitimate
political forces at play within this country to continue to promote their options for
change within the prevailing constitutional and legal framework, while respecting
basic rights and fundamental principles.
Nevertheless, the work is not finished. The Constitution, even as it continues to
provide the legal and conventional bases for order and stability, must itself be
capable of growth and adaptation, as changing circumstances and conditions may
require. Such modifications are sometimes the concrete product of formal
constitutional amendment, but constitutional amendments are usually difficult to
achieve. More often than not, change manifests itself over time as the result of
a slow, evolutionary process of subtle, incremental steps, not all of which lead
inexorably in the same direction, and the pattern of which is sometimes evident
only after the fact.
Canada‟s Supreme Court, like the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
before it, has been instrumental to the growth and development of Canadian
constitutional law. The judges of the Supreme Court, as well as those of superior
and appellate courts throughout the land, will continue to exercise their role as
Australian Constitutional Law: Materials and Commentary, 6th ed. (Sydney: Butterworths, 1999),
at 11.)
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the legal arbiters and guardians not only of the provisions of the Constitution,
but also of the high objects, principles and values upon which the edifice rests.
The courts must, however, continue to link those principles and values to the
legal structure and provisions from which the former emanate and draw their
force. No doubt, that which often distinguishes great judges from good ones is
their ability to imbue the black letter of the law with extraordinary vision, to
wed law to the spirit of justice and to temper justice in turn with equity and
mercy. Still, it is respectfully submitted that sagacious judges will want to
continue to avoid the temptation of casting aside the dull fetters and material
confines of the written law in a quest for more exalted quarters in which to
ruminate and reflect, lest they lay themselves open to the accusation of
becoming disembodied philosopher-kings and -queens, building constitutional
castles in the air.130 The realm of abstractions — not only of broad
constitutional principles but of often vague and esoteric “concepts” and
“notions”131 — is not of this world.132 Courts can indeed “infuse” and “breathe
life” into the Constitution, but in so doing they may not stray far from the
________________________________________________________________
130

The accusation is a mean one, and often overblown, as in Morton and Knopff‟s polemic
The Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2000). For a
more subtle (yet no less iconoclastic) opinion on the modern role of the “juge-interprète” and
judicial power in the making of the law, see Lajoie, Jugements de valeurs: le discours judiciare et
le droit (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997): “La frontière entre le judiciaire et le
politique n‟est plus ce qu‟elle était. Et le juge, qui participe à ce processus en donnant sens à un
texte dont le caractère normatif l‟oblige à tenir compte de l‟effet de son interprétation sur les
justiciables qu‟il affecte, est devenu l‟arbitre des valeurs dans la société. [...]” (at 207-08).
131
Woe to the lawyer who has only a “notion” to assert. “While it may be rooted in notions
of tolerance and diversity, the exception in s. 93 [of the Constitution Act, 1867, guaranteeing
denominational school rights and privileges] is not a blanket affirmation of freedom of religion or
freedom of conscience […] [and] should not be construed as a Charter human right or freedom”
(per Beetz J. in Greater Montreal Protestant School Board v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1
S.C.R. 377, at 401). “A notion of equality between Canada‟s official language groups is obviously
present in s. 23. Beyond this, however, the section is, if anything, an exception to the provisions of
ss. 15 and 27 [of the Charter]” (per Dickson C.J., in Mahe v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, at 369).
In Société des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. v. Assn. of Parents for Fairness in Education,
Grand Falls District 50 Branch, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549, at 578, Beetz J. stated that “legal rights tend
to be seminal in nature because they are rooted in principle,” unlike language rights, “which are
based on political compromise.” This rather invidious distinction was later overturned in the
Quebec Secession Reference, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 80 (“we highlight that even though those
provisions were the product of negotiation and political compromise, that does not render them
unprincipled”), and the “notion” of equality in section 23 of the Charter and other language rights
was elevated to the rank of a “principle” in R. v. Beaulac, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768.
132
“For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways […] For as the
heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than
your thoughts” (Isaiah 55:8-9 King James Version).
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physical corpus of constitutional law if both are to thrive.133 (Metaphysician,
heal thyself.) Courts are here, generally speaking, 134 to decide concrete issues,
live controversies and prosaic disputes on the basis of principles of legality,
“strict logic and high technique.”135
The resort to “unwritten law” and conceptual abstractions is, of course,
attractive to the legal mind, and perhaps particularly so to minds trained in the
common law. “Reason is the life of the law; nay, the common law itselfe is
nothing but reason,” declaimed the great English jurist, Sir Edward Coke. 136
And by reasoning and debating of grave learned men the darknesse of ignorance is
expelled, and by the light of legall reason the right is discerned, and thereupon
judgment given according to law, which is the perfection of reason.137

“Which, then, do you think is the sort of law,” wrote the moral philosopher
and polemicist Jeremy Bentham in 1792, “which the whole host of lawyers,
from Coke himself down to Blackstone, have been trumpeting in preference [to
statute law]?”138
________________________________________________________________
133
Nor does this mean that the Constitution of Canada will necessarily be better off if, instead
of being left to the ether, unwritten principles are shoe-horned into the text of the Constitution as if
they were written constitutional provisions themselves. Vide Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada,
supra, note 115, at 9-10, and 13-14, on the “surprising” decision of the Supreme Court in New
Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319,
to add the unwritten doctrine of parliamentary privilege to the instruments listed in or scheduled to
section 52(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 that comprise “the Constitution of Canada” as it is written.
This mechanistic addition to the text of the Constitution, it is argued, not only mixed apples with
oranges, but also opened the door to uncertainty — could other doctrines or instruments be judicially
adduced as coming within the list? — with, as Hogg points out, the attendant “grave consequences” of
“supremacy and entrenchment” that apply to the listed constitutional instruments.
134
There is a difference, but arguably only of degree, when a court is sitting in an advisory
capacity in the context of a reference (discussed in the next section of this paper).
135
Maitland, ed., Year Books of Edward II, Vol. I (London: Quaritch, 1903), at xviii: “The
qualities that saved English law when the day of trial came in the Tudor age were not vulgar
common sense and the reflexions of the layman‟s unanalysed instincts: rather they were strict logic
and high technique, rooted in the Inns of Court, rooted in the Year Books, rooted in the centuries.”
136
Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England (1628-1644), drawn from the 1832 printed
edition (London: J. & W.T. Clarke, Saunders & Benning; Maxwell; S. Sweet; H. Butterworth;
Stevens & Sons; R. Pheeney; J. Richards), at [97B].
137
Id., at [232B]. Lord Coke did voice at least one criticism of contemporary cases and
commentary, which he said had lost the authority the “antient lectures or readings upon statutes”
commanded: “for now the cases are long, obscure, and intricate, full of new conceits, liker rather to
riddles than lectures, which when they are opened they vanish away like smoke;” and as for the
readers, “all their studie is to find nice evasions out of the statute.”
138
Bentham, Truth versus Ashhurst; or Law as It Is; Contrasted with What it is Said to Be
(December 1792; first published in 1823). Reproduced in Bowring, ed., The Works of Jeremy
Bentham (Edinburgh: Tait; London: Simpkin Marshall, 1843), vol. V, at 236.
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That very sort of bastard law which I have been describing to you, which they
themselves call the unwritten law, which is no more made than it is written 
which has not so much a shape to appear in  not so much a word which anybody
can say belongs to it  which comes from nobody, and is addressed to nobody 
and which, so long as it is what it is, can never, by any possibility, be either known
or settled.
How should lawyers be otherwise than fond of this brat of their own begetting? Or
how should they bear to part with it? It carries in its hand a rule of wax, which they
twist about as they please  a hook to lead the people by the nose, and a pair of
sheers to fleece them with.139

2. The Role of the Courts in the Constitutional System and Their Area of
Expertise
How, then, to achieve both needed flexibility and certainty in the supreme
law of Canada, in relation to unwritten principles? A golden metewand 140 has
been established by the Supreme Court in the Quebec Secession Reference. It is
intimately linked to the legitimate role of the courts in our constitutional
framework. We would do well to be guided by its wisdom.
In answer to a preliminary objection to the exercise of its jurisdiction in this
reference, the Supreme Court made a number of key observations. First, the
Court acknowledged that in a reference, 141 the Court is acting in “an advisory
capacity” rather than in its “traditional adjudicative function.” In this context,
the Court can find itself engaged in examining hypothetical questions “in an
________________________________________________________________

139
Id. (Emphasis in original.) The pamphlet was written in response to Mr. Justice John
Ashhurst‟s charge to a Middlesex Grand Jury on November 19, 1792, in which Justice Ashhurst‟s
propositions are set out (e.g., “Happily for us, we are not bound by any laws but such as every man
has the means of knowing.”) and to which Benthham (“Truth”) replies. “It is the judges,” Bentham
rejoins, “that make the common law. Do you know how they make it? Just as a man makes laws for
his dog. When your dog does anything you want to break him of, you wait till he does it, and then
beat him for it. This is the way you make laws for your dog: and this is the way the judges make
law for you and me. […] What way, then, has any man of coming at this dog-law? Only by
watching their proceedings: by observing in what cases they have hanged a man, in what cases they
have sent him to jail, in what cases they have seized his goods, and so forth. The French have had
enough of this dog-law; they are turning it as fast as they can into statute law, that everybody may
have a rule to go by: nor do they ever make a law without doing all they can think of to let every
creature among them know of it. The French have done many abominable things, but is this one of
them?”
140
The expression belonged to Lord Coke (i.e., “the golden metewand of the law”).
141
The “special jurisdiction” of the Court and the power of the Governor in Council to refer
questions to it for consideration and response are set out in section 53 of the Supreme Court Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26.
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exercise it would never entertain in the context of litigation.”142 Second, the
Court emphasized that even in the context of a reference, the Court should not
“entertain questions that would be inappropriate to answer.” In this context,
however, the focus is not “on whether the dispute is formally adversarial or
whether it disposes of cognizable rights.” Rather, the Court must consider
“whether the dispute is appropriately addressed by a court of law.”143
The Court cited its opinion in Reference re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.),
wherein it was stated as follows:
In exercising its discretion whether to determine a matter that is alleged to be nonjusticiable, the Court‟s primary concern is to retain its proper role within the
constitutional framework of our democratic form of government. ... In considering
its appropriate role the Court must determine whether the question is purely
political in nature and should, therefore, be determined in another forum or whether
it has a sufficient legal component to warrant the intervention of the judicial
branch.144

Therefore, the circumstances in which the Court might decline to respond on
the basis of “non-justiciability,” even in the context of a reference, to a question
put to it, would include:
(1) if to do so would take the Court beyond its own assessment of its proper
role in the constitutional framework of our democratic form of
government; or
(2) if the Court could not give an answer that lies within its area of
expertise: the interpretation of law.145
It is respectfully submitted that these same considerations may have some
bearing  not only in the context of a reference, but a fortiori, in the normal
course of adversarial litigation  on the degree to which the courts should
generally entertain arguments that are based almost exclusively on
constitutional principles (in contrast to constitutional or statutory provisions).

________________________________________________________________
142

Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra, note 131, at para. 25.
Id., at para. 26. [Emphasis added.]
144
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 525, at 545. [Underlining added by the Court in the Quebec Secession
Reference, supra, note 131, at para. 26.]
145
Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra, note 131, at para. 26. [Emphasis added.]
143
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3. Some Related Questions and Guidance for the Courts
This is not to say that constitutional principles do not have their place in
constitutional adjudication. The weight of the jurisprudence (and, it is hoped, this
paper) demonstrates that they can perform a useful and necessary role in elucidating
and enriching constitutional meaning. Before giving full play to constitutional
principles in a given case, however, courts might ask themselves several of the
following questions.
Is the principle relevant to the interpretation of a constitutional or statutory
provision at issue? Can the words of the provision reasonably bear the construction
placed upon them by the party contending for the application of the principle, or do
they alter the basic thrust of the text? Is resort to the principle essential to the
disposition of the case? Are we being asked to apply the principle in furtherance of
a constitutional provision, or in lieu of one? If it is the latter, what normative force
or weight should the principle carry in these circumstances? Should it be balanced
with other constitutional principles or textual considerations? Does the principle we
are asked to invoke establish a duty, rule or obligation of a constitutional character?
If so, whom will it bind: the parties to the case? Political actors? The courts?
Everyone? Is it enforceable at law, or is it a political obligation in the nature of a
constitutional convention? If it is a convention, does it satisfy the test formulated by
Jennings146 for the existence of a convention? Is it appropriate, in the circumstances
of the case, to pronounce upon the existence of a convention or to apply the
principle? Shall applying the principle assist in resolving the controversy at issue
and in clarifying the state of the law? Will reliance upon the principle reduce legal
uncertainty, or will it contribute to it?
These ancillary questions can all be seen as elements of the larger issues
formulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession
Reference. Are the courts being asked to go beyond their proper role in the
constitutional framework? Are the courts being asked to give answers that lie
within their area of expertise: the interpretation of law?
If those considerations are borne in mind, constitutional principles will
continue to act as the foundation stones of the constitutional structure. If those
considerations are ignored, the castle may prove to have been built on sand.

________________________________________________________________
146

Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, 5th ed. (London: University of London Press,

1959).
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